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Abstract. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a prominent technique in in-
dustrial and scientific risk assessment. Repairable Fault Trees (RFT)
enhance the classical Fault Tree (FT) model by introducing the possibil-
ity to describe complex dependent repairs of system components. Usual
frameworks for analyzing FTs such as BDD, SBDD, and Markov chains
fail to assess the desired properties over RFT complex models, either
because these become too large, or due to cyclic behaviour introduced
by dependent repairs. Simulation is another way to carry out this kind
of analysis. In this paper we review the RFT model with Repair Boxes
as introduced by Daniele Codetta-Raiteri. We present compositional se-
mantics for this model in terms of Input/Output Stochastic Automata,
which allows for the modelling of events occurring according to general
continuous distribution. Moreover, we prove that the semantics generates
(weakly) deterministic models, hence suitable for discrete event simula-
tion, and prominently for Rare Event Simulation using the FIG tool.
1 Introduction
Fault Tree Analysis is a prominent technique for dependability assessment of
complex industrial systems. Standard or Static Fault Trees (SFTs [21]) are DAGs
whose leafs are called Basic Events (BE), and usually represent the failure of a
physical system component. Each leaf is equipped with a failure rate or dis-
crete probability, indicating the frequency at which the component breaks. The
other FT nodes are called gates, and they model how basic components failures
combine to induce more complex system failures, until the failure of interest
(the top event of the tree) occurs. SFTs thus encode a logical formula. One of
the most efficient analysis techniques uses Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) to
represent the formula, and then perform dependability studies using specialised
algorithms. This assumes the absence of stochastic dependency among BEs.
Many extensions to SFTs allow for further modelling capabilities. One of the
most studied are Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs [16,22]). DFTs add gates to de-
scribe time- and order-dependence among the tree nodes, in contrast to the plain
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combinatorial behavior of SFT gates. New analysis methods were introduced in
order to capture temporal requirements, such as cut sequences, translation to
Markov models [16,16,6], Sequence BDDs [19,28,35], algebraic approaches [25,1],
simulation, and combination and optimisations thereof [3,20].
Repairable Fault Trees (RFT [4,27,2,6]) increase FTs expressiveness by in-
troducing the possibility to model complex inter-dependent repair mechanisms
for basic components, i.e. system components that produce the basic events.
In former models such as DFT, certain notions of repair had been addressed
by allowing components to be repaired independently. Nevertheless, this is not
usual in real world systems, where repair scheduling, resources management, and
maintenance play an important role. To address this, we will focus on the Repair
Box model (RBOX [18,27]). A RBOX models a repair unit in charge of repair-
ing certain BEs following certain policy. Different repair policies such as first
come first serve, priority service, random or nondeterministic choice, allow to
analyze the impact of taking these decisions in the real system. The introduction
of these boxes greatly changes the dynamic of the tree. Quantitative analyses
are no longer a combinatorial calculation, since the evolution of the system over
time has to be considered [32]. Furthermore, traditional qualitative analysis such
as cut sets lack of utility by not taking repairability into account. Traditional
quantitative analysis is also discarded by the cyclic behavior introduced by this
model which disallows to use combinatorial solutions proposed for non repairable
FTs and require a state based solution instead [3].
In this work we present a formal definition of Repairable Fault Trees (RFT),
along with its semantics given in terms of Input/Output Stochastic Automata
(IOSA) [15,17]. We show that the underlying IOSA semantics of the RFT specifi-
cation is weakly deterministic, that is, the non-determinism present in the IOSA
model is spurious. Hence the model is equivalent to a fully stochastic model
and thus amenable to discrete event simulation. IOSA allows us to model RFTs
general continuous failure and repair distributions.
A variety of works address the problem of defining a rigorous syntax and
semantics to FT, DFT, and RFT [14,4,6,2,6, etc.]. They usually differ, for exam-
ple, in the types and meaning of gates, expressiveness power, how spare elements
are claimed and how repair races are resolved. Presence of non-deterministic sit-
uations is also a main discording issue. Comprehensive surveys on FTs can be
found in [22] and [32]. In Section 5 we formally define the syntax for RFTs
in a similar manner as [5] has done for DFTs. Furthermore, in order to define
the compositional and weakly deterministic semantics using IOSA, we discuss
different concerns about determinism on RFTs.
As discussed before, RFT analysis requires a state space solution. This usu-
ally means one of the following two approaches. A first approach would be trans-
lating the model to a Markov model, applying as much optimisations as possible
during the modelling and analysis in order to relieve the state explosion prob-
lem as much as possible. This is the approach followed by many works such
as [2,3,4]. Two main drawbacks can be pointed out on this approach. The first
one is that no matter which existing optimisation methods are used, there is no
guarantee that there will be a significant state space reduction in general models.
This is a specially difficult situation in big and complex industrial size systems
analysis involving repair. A second drawback is the restriction to exponentially
distributed events, not allowing to correctly model real life systems where tim-
ing is governed by other continuous distributions. This is the case for example of
phenomena such as timeouts in communication protocols, hard deadlines in real-
time systems, human response times or the variability of the delay of sound and
video frames (so-called jitter) in modern multi-media communication systems,
which are typically described by non-memoryless distributions such as uniform,
log-normal, or Weibull distributions [17]. A second approach to RFT analysis
would be recurring to simulation, which does not need the full state space of
the model to be constructed, and does not impose per se the restriction to any
kind of probabilistic distributions. The main problem when confronting simula-
tion is the big amount of computation needed to reach a sufficiently accurate
result. This is a most relevant issue when analyzing highly dependable or fault
tolerant systems, where the failure probability is very small and plane Monte
Carlo simulation becomes infeasible. To face this problem one can make use of
Rare Event Simulation techniques such as Importance Splitting or Importance
Sampling [33,10,11,29].
Our main contribution in this work consists in a method for precisely mod-
elling RFTs with generally distributed events. Furthermore, by yielding a deter-
ministic IOSA model, thus amenable to discrete event simulation, we are able
to analyze it on the FIG Rare Event Simulation Tool [11,12], greatly improving
efficiency when analyzing highly dependable systems. Also the recent work [31]
takes on the matter of using rare event simulation to analyze DFTs with com-
plex repairs. Nevertheless, they restrict to Exponential and Erlang distributions
and they finally conduce their analysis over a Markov model hence suffering of
potential states space explosion.
2 Repair Fault Trees
In Fig. 1 we depict the set of RFTelements that we consider in this work. Each
of them has a set of inputs where to connect its subtrees, and an output (if ap-
plicable) to propagate the failure, repair and other signals. The propagation of
a failure and its subsequent repair starts at the leafs of the fault tree, including
only (spare) basic elements. When one of them fails, or gets repaired, it instan-
taneously propagates the event to the gates to which it is connected. The state
of a gate changes based on the signals it receives from its inputs and propagates
its new state to the gates it serves as input. Thus, a proper combination and
timing of fail signals may change a gate’s state to failing, and similarly, a proper
combination and timing of repair signals may change it back to a working state.
This very much depends on the type of gate. The state changes will at the same
time trigger output signals accordingly. Not only fail and repair signals, but also
other signals may be produced, as it can be in the case of repair boxes, which
may output a start repairing signal to any of their input basic elements.
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Fig. 1: RFT elements
The intuition about the
behavior of each gate is as
follows. An AND gate fails
whenever all its inputs fail,
and gets repaired (stop fail-
ing) when at least one of its
inputs is repaired. An OR
gate fails whenever at least
one of its inputs fails and
is repaired when all of its
inputs are repaired. A k/n
VOTING gate fails when-
ever at least k of its n in-
puts fail and stops failing if
at most k−1 of its inputs re-
main failing. A PAND gate
fails whenever its inputs fail
from left to right, inducing
an order on the failure oc-
currence, and it is repaired if the last input is repaired. A functional dependency
gate (FDEP) has n + 1 inputs. The fail signal of one of its inputs (the trigger-
ing one) makes all the other inputs inaccessible to the rest of the system. Note
that the dependent inputs do not necessarily fail, and they will be accessible
again as soon as the triggering component is repaired (note the difference with
[6,31] where dependent BEs do fail). In fact this gate can be easily replaced by
a system of OR gates [34]. A spare basic element (SBE) is a special case of BE
which can be enabled and disabled, and can be used as spare parts for other
BEs through spare gates. A same SBE can be shared by several spare gates,
and different sharing policies are introduced for this purpose. A spare gate (SG)
allows to replace a basic element by one of several spare basic elements in case
it fails. Each spare gate has a main input and n spare parts inputs. The main
input can only be a BE. The spare inputs can only be SBEs. As soon as the
main input fails, the SG uses its own policy to ask for the replacement by one
of its spare inputs. The SG will fail whenever it does not obtain a replacement,
and will signal repair whenever the main input gets repaired or a spare input is
obtained. If an in-use replacement fails the SG will look for a new one. If the
main input is repaired, the SG will free the acquired spare input, in case there
is one. A repair box (RBOX) is the unit in charge of managing the repairing of
failed BEs and SBEs. They have n inputs, which are the elements administered
for repairing, and a dummy output. A RBOX policy determines in which order
the failing elements will be repaired. Also notice that a RBOX can only repair
one of its inputs at a time, while the rest of its failing inputs are waiting for
repair.
3 Input/Output Stochastic Automata
Input/Output Stochastic Automata [15,17] is a modelling formalism tailored to
model stochastic systems for the purpose of simulation. IOSA combine continu-
ous probability jumps from Stochastic Automata, with discrete event synchroni-
sation for a compositional style of modelling. IOSAs use continuous random vari-
ables to control and observe the passage of time. These variables, called clocks,
are set to a value according to their associated probability distribution, and, as
time evolves, count down all at the same rate until they reach the value of zero.
Clocks control the moments when actions are taken, and thus allow to model
systems where events occur at random continuous time stamps. Output and in-
put transitions can be used to synchronize and communicate between different
IOSAs. Output transitions are autonomous, while inputs occurrence depends on
synchronisation with outputs. A transversal classification for actions allows to
mark them as urgent or non urgent. While a non-urgent output is controlled by
the expiration of clocks (i.e., clocks reaching the value zero), an urgent output
action is taken as soon as the state in which it is enabled is reached. Though an
IOSA may be non-deterministic, [17] provides a set of sufficient conditions that
guarantee weak determinism (i.e. only spurious non-determinism is present).
Furthermore, such conditions can be checked with a polynomial algorithm on
the components of the model.
Definition 1. An input/output stochastic automaton with urgency (IOSA) is
a structure (S,A, C,−→, C0, s0), where S is a (denumerable) set of states, A is
a (denumerable) set of labels partitioned into disjoint sets of input labels Ai
and output labels Ao, from which a subset Au ⊆ A is marked as urgent, C is a
(finite) set of clocks such that each x ∈ C has an associated continuous probability
measure µx on R s.t. µx(R>0) = 1, −→ ⊆ S×C×A×C×S is a transition function,
C0 is the set of clocks that are initialized in the initial state, and s0 ∈ S is the
initial state. In addition it should satisfy the following constraints:
(a) If s C,a,C
′
−−−−−→ s′ and a ∈ Ai ∪ Au, then C = ∅.
(b) If s C,a,C
′
−−−−−→ s′ and a ∈ Ao \ Au, then C is a singleton set.
(c) If s
{x},a1,C1−−−−−−−→ s1 and s {x},a2,C2−−−−−−−→ s2 then a1 = a2, C1 = C2 and s1 = s2.
(d) For every a ∈ Ai and state s, there exists a transition s ∅,a,C−−−−→ s′.
(e) For every a ∈ Ai, if s ∅,a,C
′
1−−−−−→ s1 and s ∅,a,C
′
2−−−−−→ s2, C ′1 = C ′2 and s1 = s2.
(f) There exists a function active : S → 2C such that: (i) active(s0) ⊆ C0,
(ii) enabling(s) ⊆ active(s), (iii) if s is stable, active(s) = enabling(s), and
(iv) if t C,a,C
′
−−−−−→ s then active(s) ⊆ (active(t) \ C) ∪ C ′.
where enabling(s) = {y | s {y},_,_−−−−−−→ _}, and s is stable if there is no a ∈ Au∩Ao
such that s
∅,a,_−−−−→ _. (_ indicates the existential quantification of a parameter.)
Restrictions (a) to (f) are there to ensure that at most one non-urgent output
action is enabled at a time. If in addition the IOSA is closed (i.e., all commu-
nications have been resolved and hence the set of inputs is empty) and all its
Table 1: Parallel composition on IOSA
s1
C,a,C′−−−−−→1 s′1
s1||s2 C,a,C
′−−−−−→ s′1||s2
a ∈ A1\A2 (1) s2
C,a,C′−−−−−→2 s′2
s1||s2 C,a,C
′−−−−−→ s1||s′2
a ∈ A2\A1 (2)
s1
C1,a,C
′
1−−−−−−→1 s′1 s2
C2,a,C
′
2−−−−−−→2 s′2
s1||s2 C1∪C2,a,C
′
1∪C′2−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1||s′2
a ∈ A1∩A2
(3)
urgent actions are confluent (in the sense of [26], see also Def. 5) it turns out all
the non-determinism is spurious and does not alter the stochastic behavior (i.e.
regardless of how non-determinism is resolved, the stochastic properties remain
the same) [15,17]. We call this property weak determinism.
IOSAs are closed under parallel composition which is defined according to
rules in Table 1. In order to avoid unintended behavior, the component IOSAs
are requested to be compatible, that is, they should not share output actions nor
clocks, and be consistent with respect to urgent actions.
4 IOSA symbolic language
1 module BE
2 fc, rc : clock;
3 inform : [0..2] init 0;
4 broken : [0..2] init 0;
5
6 [fl!] broken=0 @ fc -> (inform’=1) & (broken’=1);
7 [r??] broken=1 -> (broken’=2) & (rc’=γ);
8 [up!] broken=2 @ rc -> (inform’=2) &
9 (broken’=0) & (fc’=µ);
10
11 [f!!] inform=1 -> (inform’=0);
12 [u!!] inform=2 -> (inform’=0);
13 endmodule
Fig. 2: Basic Element IOSA symbolic model.
We present a symbolic lan-
guage to describe an IOSA
model. This language is the
input language of the tool
FIG [12,10] and has some
strong resemblance with the
PRISMmodelling language [23].
IOSAs compositional style of
modelling is also reflected in
the language, where each com-
ponent is modeled separately
by what we call a module. A
module is composed of a set of
variables, whose valuation represent the actual state of the component, a set
of clocks corresponding to the enabling clocks for non urgent transitions, and a
set of transitions which symbolically describe the possible jumps between states
(changes of valuations and resetting of clocks). Fig. 2 models a basic element
as an example. Variables can be of integer (with finite range) or boolean type.
As we will see later, also arrays can be defined as variables. An initial value for
each variable is determined after the keyword init. Clocks measures are defined
at the transitions where they are reset. A transition is described by the name of
the action which takes place, a guard that defines the origin states, an enabling
clock (only for the case of non-urgent output transitions), a condition describing
the target states, and the set of clocks to be reset. A quick overview of Fig. 2
will help to further understand our symbolic language: Two clocks, fc and rc,
are defined at line 2. These clocks will be used as enabling clocks for transitions
at lines 6 and 8, and reset on transitions at lines 7 and 9 where γ and µ are
the distribution associated with rc and fc, respectively. Lines 3 and 4 define
variables inform and broken, both of integer type ranging between 0 and 2, and
initialized with value 0. Line 6 defines a set of non-urgent output transitions,
which produce the output action fl. More precisely, this line defines the set of
non-urgent transitions s
{fc},fl!,∅−−−−−−−−→ s′, where s meets the condition broken=0,
and s′ is the result of changing the values of variables inform and broken to
1 while other variables remain with the same values as those in state s. The
@ symbol precedes the enabling clock for the transition while the -> symbol
distinguishes between conditions for the origin state and the target state. The
conditions on the target state are expressed as assignments to the next values
of the variables, indicated with an apostrophe. Line 7 defines an urgent input
transition with label r. The double question marks after the name indicates that
it describes urgent input transitions. Urgent output transition are indicated with
double exclamation marks (!!), non urgent input transitions with a single ques-
tion mark, and non-urgent output transitions with a single exclamation mark.
At the end of line 7 we find the reset of the clock rc to a value from a probability
distribution γ. This line then defines transitions s
∅,r??,{rc}−−−−−−−−→ s′, where s meets
with condition broken=1 and s′ is identical to s except for variable broken which
has value 2. At line 11, an urgent output transition is defined, indicating the
failure of this component through action f!!. We will usually use these urgent
transitions to synchronize and communicate with other modules.
The text of Fig. 2 is tacitly completed with self-loops with all inputs in
all constraints that are not explicitly written. For example, in Fig. 2, the line
“[r??] broken != 1 -> ;” is assumed to exist.
5 A formal syntax for RFT and its semantics
In this section we present a formal definition of the RFT similar to those of
[5,7] along with its semantics given in terms of IOSA. Each element of a RFT is
characterized by a tuple consisting of its type, its arity (i.e. number of inputs),
and possibly other parameters like probability distributions for fail and repair
events in a BE.
Definition 2. Let n,m, k ∈ N+, and let µ, ν and γ be continuous probability
distributions. We define the set E of elements of a RFT to be composed of the
following tuples:
– (be, 0, µ, γ) and (sbe, 0, µ, ν, γ), which represents basic and spare basic ele-
ments, with no inputs, with an active failure distribution µ, a dormant failure
distribution ν, and a repair distribution γ.
– (and, n), (or, n) and (pand, n), which represent AND, OR and PAND gates
with n inputs, respectively,
– (vot, n, k), which represent a k from n voting gate,
– (fdep, n), which represents a functional dependency gate, with 1 trigger input
and n−1 dependent ones. By convention the first input is the triggering one.
– (sg, n), which represents a SPARE gate with one main input and n−1 spare
inputs. By convention the first input is the main one.
– (rbox, n), which represents a RBOX element for n BEs (or SBEs).
A RFT is a directed acyclic graph, for which every vertex v is labeled with an
element l(v) ∈ E . An edge from v to w means that the output of v is connected
to an input of w. Since the order of the inputs is relevant, we give them in terms
of a list i(w) instead of a set. Similarly, si(v) will list all the spare gates to which
a spare basic element v is connected as an input. Let t(v) indicate the type of
v. That is, t(v) is the first projection of l(v). Let #(v) indicate the number of
inputs of v, that is, it is the second projection l(v).
Definition 3. A repair fault tree is a four-tuple T = (V, i, si, l), where V is a
set of vertices, l : V → E is a function labeling each vertex with a RFT element,
i : V → V ∗ is a function assigning #(v) inputs to each element v in V , and
si : V → V ∗ which indicate which spare gates manage each spare BE. The set of
edges E = {(v, w) ∈ V 2 | ∃j · v = (i(w))[j]} is the set of pairs (v, w) such that
v is an input of w. If such an edge exists, we will say that v is connected to w
and w to v. In addition, a RFT T should satisfy the following conditions:
– The tuple (V,E) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
– T has a unique top element, i.e. a unique element whose non dummy output
is not connected to another gate. That is, there is a unique vertex v ∈ V
such that for all w ∈ V , (v, w) /∈ E and t(v) 6= fdep, rbox.
– An output can not be more than once the input of a same gate. That is, for
all 1 ≤ j, k ≤ |i(w)| with i(w)[j] = i(w)[k], we have j = k.
– Since FDEP and RBOX outputs are dummy, if (v, w) ∈ E then t(v) /∈
{fdep, rbox}.
– The inputs of a repair box can only be basic elements. I.e., if (v, w) ∈ E and
t(w) = rbox then either t(v) = be or t(v) = sbe.
– Each (spare) basic element can be connected to a single RBOX. I.e., if
(v, w) ∈ E and (v, w′) ∈ E and t(w) = t(w′) = rbox, then w = w′.
– The spare inputs of a spare gate can only be spare basic elements, while its
main input can only be a basic element. I.e., if (v, w) ∈ E and t(w) = sg then
t(i(v)[0]) = be and for j > 0, t(i(v)[j]) = sbe. Furthermore, a spare basic
element can only be connected to a spare gate or a RBOX, i.e., if (v, w) ∈ E
and t(v) = sbe then t(w) ∈ {sg, rbox}.
– A spare basic element is an input of a spare gate, if and only if that spare
gate is spare input of the spare basic element, i.e. for v and v′ such that
l(v′) = (sbe, 0, µ, ν, γ) and l(v) = (sg, n), (v′, v) ∈ E if and only if there
exists j such that v = si(v′)[j].
– A basic element can be connected to at most one spare gate, i.e. if (v, w) ∈ E
and (v, w′) ∈ E with t(w) = t(w′) = sg and t(v) = be then w = w′.
– If a basic element is connected to a spare gate then it can not be connected
to a FDEP gate, i.e. if (v, w) ∈ E and t(v) = be and t(w′) = sg, then there
is no (v, w′) ∈ E such that t(w′) = fdep.
In the following, we present a parametric semantics for RFT elements. This
will be used later to obtain the semantics for each vertex in a given RFT, and
the consequent semantics of the full model as a parallel composition of its com-
ponents. In this section, we only give the semantics for BEs, AND gates, OR
gates, PAND gates, and RBOX. Remember that FDEP can be replaced by OR
gates. Similarly, voting gates can be modeled by a series of AND and OR gates
(although a simpler model can be found in Appendix D). In the design of the
IOSA modules we should take into account the communication of each element
of a RFT with its children and parents. For instance a basic element has to com-
municate its failure and repair to those gates for which it is an input. Similarly,
a RBOX has to communicate to its inputs a start repairing signal. In order to
do so, the semantics of each element will be given by a function, which takes
actions as parameters.
1 module AND
2 informf: bool init false;
3 informu: bool init false;
4 count: [0..2] init 0;
5
6 [f1??] count=1 -> (count’=2) & (informf’=true);
7 [f1??] count=0 -> (count’=1);
8 [f1??] count=2 -> ;
9 [f2??] count=1 -> (count’=2) & (informf’=true);
10 [f2??] count=0 -> (count’=1);
11 [f2??] count=2 -> ;
12
13 [u1??] count=2 -> (count’=1) & (informu’=true);
14 [u1??] count=1 -> (count’=0);
15 [u1??] count=0 -> ;
16 [u2??] count=2 -> (count’=1) & (informu’=true);
17 [u2??] count=1 -> (count’=0);
18 [u2??] count=0 -> ;
19
20 [f!!] informf & count=2 -> (informf’=false);
21 [u!!] informu & count!=2 -> (informu’=false);
22 endmodule
Fig. 3: AND gate IOSA symbolic model.
For a BE element e ∈
E , its semantics is a function
[[e]] : A5 → IOSA, where
[[(be, 0, µ, γ)]](fl, up, f, u, r) results
in the IOSA of Fig. 2. The state
of a basic element is defined
by the fail clock fc, the repair
clock rc, a variable signal that
indicates when to signal the
failure or repair, and variable
broken to distinguish between
broken and normal states. A
basic element fails when clock
fc expires (line 6) and immedi-
ately informs it with the urgent
signal f!! at line 11. As soon as
the repair begins by the corre-
sponding connected repair box
(line 7), clock rc is set. When
it expires, the component be-
comes repaired. Hence, fc is set
again at line 8, and the repair is signaled with urgent action u!! at line 11. At
the starting state of an IOSA module all its clocks are set randomly according
to their associated distributions. Thus, rc is set at the initial state and could
eventually expire without having been set by a repair transition. This is why
we have to distinguish between cases when the BE is being repaired (broken=2)
from when it is not.
For an AND gate element with two inputs, its semantics is a function [[e]] :
A6 → IOSA, where [[(and, 2)]](f, u, f1, u1, f2, u2) results in the IOSA in Fig. 3. At
lines 6 to 11, the AND gate gets informed of the failure of either of its inputs.
Upon failure of some input, we distinguish between the case where the other
input has already failed (count=1) and the case where it has not (count=0). In
the first case the AND gate has to move to a failure state, for which we set the
informf variable in order to enable the signaling of failure at line 20. Furthermore
in both cases we increase the value of count so that we take note of the failure of
an input. A similar reasoning is done for the case of the repairing of an input at
lines 13 to 18. In this case we have to set the module to signal a repair when an
input gets repaired at a state where both inputs were failing (lines 13 and 16),
by enabling transition at line 21. From now on, we omit writing down self loops
originated by IOSA’s input enabledness, such as lines 8, 11, 15 and 18 as they
are assumed to be there. Nevertheless, we remark that it is necessary to take
them into account when analyzing confluence in the next section. The semantics
for an OR gate is similar to the AND gate and can be found in Appendix B.
The semantics of a n inputs repair box with priority policy, is a function
[[(rbox, n)]] : A3∗n → IOSA, where [[(rbox, n)]](fl0, up0, r0, ..., fln−1, upn−1, rn−1)
results in the IOSA of Fig. 4. The RBOX with priority uses the array broken[n]
1 module RBOX
2 broken[n]: bool init false;
3 busy: bool init false;
4
5 [fl0?] -> (broken[0]’=true);
6 ...
7 [fln−1?] -> (broken[n-1]’=true);
8
9 [r0!!] !busy & broken[0] -> (busy’=true);
10 ...
11 [rn−1!!] !busy & broken[n-1] & !broken[n-2]
12 & ... & !broken[0] -> (busy’=true);
13
14 [up0?] -> (broken[0]’=false) & (busy’=false);
15 ...
16 [upn−1?] -> (broken[n-1]’=false) & (busy’=false);
17 endmodule
Fig. 4: RBOX with priority policy
to keep track of failed in-
puts, updating it when
it receives their fail sig-
nals (lines 5 to 7) and up
signals (lines 13 to 15).
At the same time, when
not busy, it sends repair
signals to broken inputs
(lines 9 to 12). Guards en-
sure the priority order for
repairing. Note that in-
stead of listening to the
urgent output signals of
the input BEs, it listens
for the non-urgent actions
of the transitions that trigger the failure or repair. This is done with the only
purpose of facilitating the confluence analysis over this module. Other types of
repair boxes can be modeled, taking into account different repairing policies. (see
App. C).
The semantics of a Priority AND gate with 2 inputs is defined by [[(pand, 2)]] :
A6 → IOSA, where [[(pand, 2)]](f, u, f0, u0, f1, u1) results in the IOSA of Fig. 5.
PAND gates fail only when their inputs fail from left to right. This allows to
condition the failure of a system not only to the failure of the subsystems but
also to the ordering in which they fail. Notice that an n inputs PAND gate is
simply a syntax sugar for a system of n − 1 two-input PAND gates connected
in cascade. Literature is not always clear or even disagrees on what should be
the behavior of the PAND gate in case both inputs fail at the same time [24,14].
This situation arises in some constructions with AND and OR gates, or when the
inputs of a PAND gate are connected to the a same FDEP (see Fig. 6). Some pro-
posals disallow these situations and discard them on early syntactic checks [31].
1 module PAND
2
3 f1: bool init false;
4 f2: bool init false;
5 st: [0..4] init 0; \\ up, inform fail, failed,
6 inform up, unbreakable
7
8 [_?] st=0 & f1 & !f0 -> (st’=4);
9
10 [f0??] st=0 & !f0 & !f1-> (f0’=true);
11 [f0??] st=0 & !f0 & f1 -> (st’=1) & (f0’=true);
12 [f0??] st!=0 & !f0 -> (f0’=true);
13 [f0??] f0 -> ;
14
15 [f1??] st=0 & !f0 & !f1 -> (f1’=true);
16 [f1??] st=0 & f0 & !f1 -> (st’=1) & (f1’=true);
17 [f1??] st=3 & !f1 -> (st’=2) & (f1’=true);
18 [f1??] (st==1|st==2|st=4) & !f1 -> (f1’=true);
19 [f1??] f1 -> ;
20
21 [u0??] st!=1 & f0 -> (f0’=false);
22 [u0??] st=1 & f0 -> (st’=0) & (f0’=false);
23 [u0??] !f0 -> ;
24
25 [u1??] (st=0|st=3) & f1 -> (f1’=false);
26 [u1??] (st=1|st=4) & f1 -> (st’=0) & (f1’=false);
27 [u1??] st=2 & f1 -> (st’=3) & (f1’=false);
28
29 [f!!] st=1 -> (st’=2);
30 [u!!] st=3 -> (st’=0);
31
32 endmodule
Fig. 5: PAND gate.
Some others assume a non-
deterministic situation and
find it important to analyze
scenarios where the behavior
is in fact unknown [5]. Other
works decided that the PAND
gate does not fail unless its in-
puts break strictly from left
to right [6,4]. Some others
state that PAND gates also
fail when both their inputs
fail at the same time [14,9,8].
We opted for this last case,
so the gates needs to be able
to identify if time has passed
between the occurrence of the
failures, and act consequently.
In the particular case where
no time passes between the
failure of the inputs, we con-
sider that the order in which
the dependent BEs fail does
not really matter and thus the
non-determinism is spurious.
To identify if time has passed
between the occurrence of the input failures, the model listens to any output
actions, which indicate that a clock has expired.
Fig. 6: Spurious non-determinism.
This is done by a special input action
at line 8, which synchronizes with all non-
urgent outputs, regardless the name of the
action. Notice that there is only one sce-
nario that we want to rule out, which is
when the second input fails and then time
passes without the first input failing too.
This is in fact the case described by the
guard of line 8. Furthermore, this tran-
sition moves to the ‘unbreakable’ state,
from which it can only go back when in-
put 1 is fixed. In consequence, the failure of the gate occurs either if both inputs
fail at the same time or if the first input fails, then time passes, and then the
second input fails.
The semantics of a RFT is that of the parallel composition of the semantics
of its components, being conveniently synchronized.
Definition 4. Given a RFT T = (V, i, si, l) we define the semantics of T as
[[T ]] = ||v∈V [[v]] where [[v]] is defined by:
[[v]] =

[[l(v)]](flv, upv, fv, uv, rv) if l(v) = (be, 0, µ, γ)
[[l(v)]](fv, uv, fi(v)[0], ui(v)[0], ..., fi(v)[n−1], ui(v)[n−1])
if l(v) ∈ {(and, n), (or, n)}
[[l(v)]](fv, uv, fi(v)[0], ui(v)[0], fi(v)[1], ui(v)[1]) if l(v) = (pand, 2)
[[l(v)]](fli(v)[0], upi(v)[0], ri(v)[0], ..., fli(v)[n−1], upi(v)[n−1], ri(v)[n−1])
if l(v) = (rbox, n)
In Section 7, we extend the semantics to spare gates and spare basic elements.
6 RFTs are weakly deterministic
In this section we show that RFTs composed only by BEs, AND gates, OR gates,
PAND gates, and RBOX, are weakly deterministic. Since voting and FDEP gates
can be constructed using OR and AND gates, the result extends to these gates.
Results in this section rely heavily on results about weak determinism on IOSA
proven in [17]. Therefore, we first summarize the essentials of [17] for this paper.
Definition 5. An IOSA is confluent if for all pair of urgent actions a and b, and
for every (reachable) state s, it satisfies that, if s ∅,a,C1−−−−−→ s1 and s ∅,b,C2−−−−−→ s2,
then there is a state s3 such that s2
∅,a,C1−−−−−→ s3 and s1 ∅,b,C2−−−−−→ s3.
Note that, according to this definition, regardless the order of the confluent
transitions, the same state is reached. This non-determinism is spurious in the
sense that it does not alter the stochastic properties of the given IOSA, regardless
the manner it is solved. Since non-determinism can only arise on urgent actions,
we say that a closed IOSA is weakly deterministic if all its urgent actions are
confluent. In [17], we provided sufficient conditions to ensure that a closed IOSA
is weakly deterministic. This is stated in Theorem 1 below which requires the
following definition.
Definition 6. Given an IOSA I with state space S and actions A, we distin-
guish the following sets of actions:
– A set of urgent output actions B ⊆ Ao∩Au is initial if each b ∈ B is enabled
in s0, i.e. if for each b ∈ B there is a state s ∈ S and C ⊆ C, such that
s0
∅,b,C−−−−→ s.
– We say that a set B ⊆ Ao ∩ Au of output urgent actions is spontaneously
enabled by b ∈ A \Au if there are stochastically reachable states s, s′ ∈ S (a
state is stochastically reachable if there is a path in the IOSA from the initial
state that reaches such state with probability greater than zero) such that s
is stable, s
_,b,_−−−−→ s′, and all actions in B are enabled in s′.
– Let a ∈ Au and b ∈ Ao ∩ Au. We say that a triggers b if there are stochas-
tically reachable states s1, s2, s3 ∈ S such that: s1 _,a,_−−−−→ s2, s2 _,b,_−−−−→ s3,
and, if a 6= b, then there is no outgoing transition from s1 labeled with b.
The set {(a, b) | a triggers b} is called the triggering relation.
The approximate indirect triggering relation of a composite IOSA is defined
as the reflexive transitive closure of the union of the triggering relations of its
components. The following theorem from [17], gives necessary conditions for a
closed IOSA not to be confluent. As a consequence, it provides sufficient condi-
tions for a closed IOSA to be weakly deterministic.
Theorem 1. Given a closed composite IOSA I = (I1|| . . . ||In) with actions A,
if I is not confluent then there exist a pair of urgent actions a, b ∈ Au such that
1. one of the components is not confluent with respect to a and b,
2. there are actions c and d that approximately indirectly trigger both a and b,
respectively, and
3. one of the following hold: (i) c and d are initial actions, or (ii) there exists
an action e and possible empty sets B1 to Bn spontaneously enabled by e in
I1 to In respectively, such that c and d are in
⋃n
i=1Bi.
In the following, we prove accessory propositions to eventually prove, using
Theorem 1, that the IOSA defined by a RFT is weakly deterministic.
Proposition 1. Let T be a RFT. [[T ]] has no initially enabled actions. Moreover,
the only spontaneous sets of actions are singletons of the form {fv} and {uv},
for t(l(v)) = be, which are spontaneously enabled by flv and upv, respectively.
Proof. As a consequence of [17], the initially enabled actions of [[T ]] are contained
in the union of the sets of initially enabled actions of its components [[v]], v ∈ V ,
and the spontaneously enabled actions of [[T ]] are contained in the union of the
spontaneously enabled sets of [[v]]. It is direct to see that, for any element e ∈ E ,
none of the urgent outputs are enabled at the initial state of [[e]], since their
guards are initially false. Furthermore, the only non-urgent output transition in
our models are at lines 6 and 8 of the BE (Fig. 2). Let v ∈ V such that t(v) = be.
Then, after taking transition at line 6 the only urgent output enabled is fv (on
the instance [[v]]), while after taking transition at line 8 the only one is uv, and
thus these are the only possible spontaneous enabled actions. uunionsq
Proposition 2. Let T be a RFT. The only possible pairs of non-confluent ac-
tions in [[T ]] are {(fv, uv′) | v, v′ ∈ i(w), t(w) ∈ {and, or, pand}}∪{(fw, uv), (uw, fv) |
v ∈ i(w), t(w) ∈ {and, or}}.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows an exhaustive check over each urgent
transition of each model, in order to single out any non-confluent situation, and
can be found at Appendix E
Proposition 3. Let T be a RFT. For each v ∈ V , the triggering relation of [[v]]
is given by:
– {}, if l(v) ∈ {(be, 0, µ, γ), (rbox, n)},
– {(fw, fv) | w ∈ i(v)} ∪ {(uw, uv) | w ∈ i(v)}, if l(v) ∈ {(and, n), (or, n)}, and
– {(uw, uv) | w = i(v)[1]} ∪ {(fw, fv) | w ∈ i(v)}, if l(v) = (pand, 2).
Proof (sketch). It sufficies to make a satisfiability analysis over guards and post-
conditions of each pair (ta, tb) with tb an output urgent symbolic transition and
ta any urgent symbolic transition, taking into account only reachable states. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Let T be a RFT. Then [[T ]] is weakly deterministic.
Proof. We look for a, b, c, d and e as well as sets Bi with i = 1 . . . n as Theorem 1
suggests. Since Prop. 1 ensures that there are no initially enabled actions in [[T ]],
c and d should be spontaneously enabled actions. By the same proposition either
e is of the form flv for some v and then
⋃1
i=1Bi = B1 = {fv}, or e is of the
form upv for some v and then
⋃1
i=1Bi = B1 = {uv}. In the first case, we get
c = d = fv for some v, and in the second case c = d = uv. Furthermore, by
Prop. 2, either a is of the form fw for some w and b is of the form uw′ for some
w′ or the other way around. As shown by Prop. 3, fail actions (fv for some v) only
trigger fail actions and up actions (uv for some v) only trigger up actions, thus
it is impossible that c and d indirectly trigger a and b respectively. Therefore,
it is not possible to find actions a, b, c, d, and e satisfying conditions 1 to 3 in
Theorem 1, and hence [[T ]] is confluent. Since [[T ]] is also closed, then it is weakly
deterministic. uunionsq
7 An extended Semantics
In this section we add the spare gate and spare basic element to the semantics
of RFTs. As before, we aim to guarantee that the IOSA model derived from
the RFT is weakly deterministic. In order to do so, we need to bring special
attention to two particular scenarios that could introduce non-determinism if
not correctly tackled.
The first scenario is given when a main basic element fails at a spare gate
which is served with several spare basic elements. At this point, it arises the
question of which of the available spare basic elements should the spare gate
take. Traditionally, spare elements are selected in order from an ordered set.
To generalize this mechanism for the selection of the spares we intend to allow
for more complex state-involved policies. It should be always the case that this
policy is deterministic in its elections. The second scenario arises when several
spare gates have requested a broken or already taken SBE, which eventually gets
fixed by a repair box or freed by the owning spare gate. At this point, it is unclear
which of the requesting spare gates will take the newly available SBE. For this,
we define sharing policies on the SBE. Thus, to provide semantics to an SBE,
we actually introduce two IOSA modules: one providing the extended behavior
of a BE that can be taken from dormant to enabled state and vice versa, and
another one, the multiplexer module, which manages the sharing of the SBE.
Notice that this scenario is not a problem in the absence of repair boxes, since in
such cases SBEs do not become available after they are taken or fail. It is neither
a problem when spare elements are not shared by different spare gates [4,3]. The
work [22] also studies race conditions in spare gates when two spare gates fail
at the same time. This last situation is impossible in our settings given the last
two properties of Definition 3 and the fact that two simultaneous failures of our
basic elements is discarded by the IOSA deterministic semantics.
The models for the spare gate, the spare basic element and the multiplexer
can be found in Appendix F. We extend the semantics of the RFT with the SBE
and SG elements as follows.
Definition 7. Given a RFT T = (V,E), we extend Definition 4 with the fol-
lowing cases:
[[v]] =

· · ·
[[l(v)]](flv, upv, fv, uv, rv, ev, dv, rq(si(v)[0],v), asg(v,si(v)[0]),
rel(si(v)[0],v), acc(si(v)[0],v), rj(v,si(v)[0]), .., rj(v,si(v)[n−1]))
if l(v) = (sbe, n, µ, ν, γ)
[[l(v)]](fv, uv, fli(v)[0], upi(v)[0], fli(v)[1], upi(v)[1], rq(v,i(v)[1]), asg(i(v)[1],v),
acc(v,i(v)[1]), rj(i(v)[1],v), rel(v,i(v)[1]), ..., rel(v,i(v)[n−1]))
if l(v) = (sg, n)
Notice that in the case of the SBE and SG, several signals are indexed by a
pair of elements. This pair indicates which gate performs the action and which
one listens for synchronisation. As an example, asg(v,si(v)[0]) indicates that the
multiplexer that manages v, assigns its spare basic element to its first connected
spare gate (si(v)[0]).
Unfortunately, we could not find an easy or direct way to prove that this
extension is indeed weakly deterministic, as we did with the RFT without spares.
This is due in part to the complexity of the IOSA modules, intended to avoid
the aforementioned non-deterministic situations. While the spare basic element
module can be easily proved to be confluent, this is not the case for the modules of
the multiplexer and the spare gate. When analyzing these modules in isolation
we find that some transitions are not confluent and Theorem 1 could not be
used directly. However, by partially composing spare gates with multiplexers, we
were able to check that conditions of Theorem 1 are not met. We automatically
perform this check in several configurations, and showed that they are confluent.
As parallel composition preserves confluence, they can be inserted in other RFT
contexts yielding weakly deterministic IOSAs. 5
8 Conclusion
In this work we have defined a semantics for Dynamic Fault Trees with repair box
in terms of Input/Output Stochastic Automata, introducing the novel feature
5 For the reviewers eyes, only: the scripts that prove said configurations are available
at https://git.cs.famaf.unc.edu.ar/raulmonti/DeterminismScriptsRFT.
of general probability measures for failure and repair rates of basic elements.
Furthermore we have shown that our semantics produces weakly deterministic
models which are hence amenable for discrete event simulation. In particular,
our models serve as direct input to the FIG Simulator (http://dsg.famaf.unc.
edu.ar/fig) [12,10], as well as other tools through the intermediate language
Jani [13]. A future work direction could be introducing maintenance mechanism
and levels of degradation as in [30], in order to increase the possibilities for
defining repair models. Another line of work would be defining an automatic
translation from a graphical modelling tool for fault trees into the IOSA models,
in order to automate and ease the modelling and analysis of industrial size
systems. Adding support for spare sub-trees such as in [] would be an interesting
upgrade too, also along with support for sub-tree dedicated repair boxes.
References
1. Amari, S., Dill, G., Howald, E.: A new approach to solve dynamic fault trees.
In: Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2003. Annual. pp. 374–379. IEEE
(2003)
2. Beccuti, M., Raiteri, D.C., Franceschinis, G., Haddad, S.: Non deterministic re-
pairable fault trees for computing optimal repair strategy. In: Baras, J.S., Cour-
coubetis, C. (eds.) 3rd International ICST Conference on Performance Eval-
uation Methodologies and Tools, VALUETOOLS 2008, Athens, Greece, Octo-
ber 20-24, 2008. p. 56. ICST/ACM (2008), https://doi.org/10.4108/ICST.
VALUETOOLS2008.4411
3. Bobbio, A., Franceschinis, G., Gaeta, R., Portinale, L.: Parametric fault tree for the
dependability analysis of redundant systems and its high-level petri net semantics.
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 29(3), 270–287 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1109/
TSE.2003.1183940
4. Bobbio, A., Raiteri, D.C.: Parametric fault trees with dynamic gates and repair
boxes. In: Reliability and Maintainability, 2004 Annual Symposium-RAMS. pp.
459–465. IEEE (2004)
5. Boudali, H., Crouzen, P., Stoelinga, M.: A compositional semantics for dynamic
fault trees in terms of interactive markov chains. In: Namjoshi, K.S., Yoneda, T.,
Higashino, T., Okamura, Y. (eds.) ATVA 2007. LNCS, vol. 4762, pp. 441–456.
Springer (2007), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75596-8_31
6. Boudali, H., Crouzen, P., Stoelinga, M.: Dynamic fault tree analysis using in-
put/output interactive markov chains. In: DSN 2007. pp. 708–717. IEEE Computer
Society (2007), https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2007.37
7. Boudali, H., Crouzen, P., Stoelinga, M.: A rigorous, compositional, and extensible
framework for dynamic fault tree analysis. IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput.
7(2), 128–143 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2009.45
8. Boudali, H., Dugan, J.B.: A discrete-time bayesian network reliability modeling
and analysis framework. Rel. Eng. & Sys. Safety 87(3), 337–349 (2005), https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2004.06.004
9. Boudali, H., Dugan, J.B.: Corrections on "a continuous-time bayesian network
reliability modeling and analysis framework". IEEE Trans. Reliability 57(3), 532–
533 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1109/TR.2008.925796
10. Budde, C.E.: Automation of Importance Splitting Techniques for Rare Event Sim-
ulation. Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (2017)
11. Budde, C.E., D’Argenio, P.R., Hermanns, H.: Rare event simulation with fully
automated importance splitting. In: Beltrán, M., Knottenbelt, W.J., Bradley, J.T.
(eds.) EPEW 2015. LNCS, vol. 9272, pp. 275–290. Springer (2015), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-23267-6_18
12. Budde, C.E., D’Argenio, P.R., Monti, R.E.: Compositional Construction of Im-
portance Functions in Fully Automated Importance Splitting. ACM (2017), http:
//dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.25-10-2016.2266501
13. Budde, C.E., Dehnert, C., Hahn, E.M., Hartmanns, A., Junges, S., Turrini, A.:
JANI: quantitative model and tool interaction. In: Legay, A., Margaria, T. (eds.)
TACAS 2017. LNCS, vol. 10206, pp. 151–168 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-662-54580-5_9
14. Coppit, D., Sullivan, K.J., Dugan, J.B.: Formal semantics for computational engi-
neering: A case study on dynamic fault trees. In: ISSRE 2000. pp. 270–282. IEEE
Computer Society (2000), https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSRE.2000.885878
15. D’Argenio, P.R., Lee, M.D., Monti, R.E.: Input/output stochastic automata -
compositionality and determinism. In: Fränzle, M., Markey, N. (eds.) FORMATS
2016. LNCS, vol. 9884, pp. 53–68. Springer (2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-44878-7_4
16. Dugan, J.B., Bavuso, S.J., Boyd, M.A.: Dynamic fault-tree models for fault-
tolerant computer systems. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 41(3), 363–377 (Sep
1992)
17. DâĂŹArgenio, P.R., Monti, R.E.: Input/output stochastic automata with urgency:
Confluence and weak determinism. In: International Colloquium on Theoretical
Aspects of Computing. pp. 132–152. Springer (2018)
18. Franceschinis, G., Gribaudo, M., Iacono, M., Mazzocca, N., Vittorini, V.: Towards
an object based multi-formalism multi-solution modeling approach. In: Proc. of
the Second Workshop on Modelling of Objects, Components and Agents Aarhus
(MOCA02), Denmark. vol. 26, pp. 47–65 (2002)
19. Ge, D., Lin, M., Yang, Y., Zhang, R., Chou, Q.: Quantitative analysis of dynamic
fault trees using improved sequential binary decision diagrams. Rel. Eng. & Sys.
Safety 142, 289–299 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2015.06.001
20. Gulati, R., Dugan, J.B.: A modular approach for analyzing static and dynamic fault
trees. In: Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. 1997 Proceedings, Annual.
pp. 57–63. IEEE (1997)
21. Haasl, D.F., Roberts, N., Vesely, W., Goldberg, F.: Fault tree handbook. Tech.
rep., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (USA). Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (1981)
22. Junges, S., Guck, D., Katoen, J., Stoelinga, M.: Uncovering dynamic fault trees.
In: DSN 2016. pp. 299–310. IEEE Computer Society (2016), https://doi.org/
10.1109/DSN.2016.35
23. Kwiatkowska, M.Z., Norman, G., Parker, D.: PRISM: probabilistic symbolic model
checker. In: Field, T., Harrison, P.G., Bradley, J.T., Harder, U. (eds.) TOOLS
2002. LNCS, vol. 2324, pp. 200–204. Springer (2002), https://doi.org/10.1007/
3-540-46029-2_13
24. Manian, R., Coppit, D.W., Sullivan, K.J., Dugan, J.B.: Bridging the gap between
systems and dynamic fault tree models. In: Reliability and Maintainability Sym-
posium, 1999. pp. 105–111. IEEE (1999)
25. Merle, G., Roussel, J., Lesage, J., Bobbio, A.: Probabilistic algebraic analysis of
fault trees with priority dynamic gates and repeated events. IEEE Trans. Reliability
59(1), 250–261 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1109/TR.2009.2035793
26. Milner, R.: Communication and concurrency. PHI Series in computer science, Pren-
tice Hall (1989)
27. Raiteri, D.C., Iacono, M., Franceschinis, G., Vittorini, V.: Repairable fault tree
for the automatic evaluation of repair policies. In: DSN 2004. pp. 659–668. IEEE
Computer Society (2004), https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311936
28. Rauzy, A.: Sequence algebra, sequence decision diagrams and dynamic fault trees.
Rel. Eng. & Sys. Safety 96(7), 785–792 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.
2011.02.005
29. Rubino, G., Tuffin, B.: Rare Event Simulation Using Monte Carlo Methods. Wiley
Publishing (2009)
30. Ruijters, E., Guck, D., Drolenga, P., Stoelinga, M.: Fault maintenance trees: re-
liability centered maintenance via statistical model checking. In: Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), 2016 Annual. pp. 1–6. IEEE (2016)
31. Ruijters, E., Reijsbergen, D., de Boer, P., Stoelinga, M.: Rare event simulation for
dynamic fault trees. In: Tonetta, S., Schoitsch, E., Bitsch, F. (eds.) Computer
Safety, Reliability, and Security - 36th International Conference, SAFECOMP
2017, Trento, Italy, September 13-15, 2017, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, vol. 10488, pp. 20–35. Springer (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-66266-4_2
32. Ruijters, E., Stoelinga, M.: Fault tree analysis: A survey of the state-of-the-art in
modeling, analysis and tools. Computer Science Review 15, 29–62 (2015), https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2015.03.001
33. Villén-Altamirano, M., Villén-Altamirano, J.: The rare event simulation method
RESTART: efficiency analysis and guidelines for its application. In: Kouvatsos,
D.D. (ed.) Network Performance Engineering - A Handbook on Convergent Multi-
Service Networks and Next Generation Internet, LNCS, vol. 5233, pp. 509–547.
Springer (2011), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02742-0_22
34. Xing, L., Dugan, J.B., Morrissette, B.A.: Efficient reliability analysis of systems
with functional dependence loops. Eksploatacja I Niezawodnosc-Maintenance and
Reliability (3), 65–69 (2009)
35. Xing, L., Shrestha, A., Dai, Y.: Exact combinatorial reliability analysis of dynamic
systems with sequence-dependent failures. Rel. Eng. & Sys. Safety 96(10), 1375–
1385 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2011.05.007
A IOSA Symbolic Language
The following context free grammar defines the complete IOSA symbolic mod-
elling language. Here * stands for as many times as you want, + for at least
one time, ? for optional, | for option, and parentheses group productions and
elements.
MODEL = (MODULE)+
MODULE = (VARIABLE | ARRAY | CLOCK) + TRANSITION+
VARIABLE = NAME : TYPE init VALUE ;
ARRAY = NAME[INT]: TYPE init VALUE ;
CLOCK = NAME : clock ;
TRANSITION = [ (NAME (?|??|!|!!)?)? ] PRE (@ NAME)? −→ POS ;
PRE = ((NAME = EXPR)(& NAME = EXPR)∗)?
POS = (( NAME’ = EXPR )(& ( NAME’ = EXPR ))∗)?
EXPR = VALUE | NAME | EXPR OP EXPR | ( EXPR ) | ! EXPR
OP = | | & | + | - | * | / | =
NAME = (a|b|...|z|A|B|...|Z)(a|b|...|z|A|B|...|Z|1|...|9|_|-)∗
TYPE = boolean | [ INT .. INT ]
VALUE = true | false | INT
INT = (1|2|...|9)(0|1|...|9)∗
Fig. 7: IOSA symbolic language grammar.
An IOSA model is composed by a set of modules, each one describing a
concurrent component of the system to model. The body of a module can be
clearly divided into three parts: the variables declarations, the clocks declara-
tions, and the transitions specification. Arrays are declared along with variables,
with the additional requirement of defining the range of the array between brack-
ets. Transitions preconditions are boolean formulas describing the origin states
for the symbolic transition. In this case the & symbol stands for the logical
conjunction operator while | stands for the logical disjunction operator. Post-
conditions on the other side, describe the changes on the module’s variables
(state) by means of assignments to future values. Each assignment is enclosed
by parenthesis, and the variable’s name is followed by an apostrophe to indicate
that corresponds to the value of the variable in the reached state after taking the
transition. An & separates each assignment. Notice the similarity with PRISM
[23] syntax for describing transitions. Along with the assignment of values to
future variables, we find the reset of clocks. A clock is assigned a probability
distribution (clock′ = γ) to indicate that it will be reset to a value from that
probability distribution immediately before reaching the new state.
B OR Gate
For an OR gate element with two inputs, its semantics is a function [[]] : A6 →
IOSA, where [[(or, 2)]](f, u, f1, u1, f2, u2) results in the following IOSA:
1 module OR
2 informf: bool init false;
3 informu: bool init false;
4 count: [0..2] init 0;
5
6 [f1??] count=0 -> (count’=1) & (informf’=true);
7 [f1??] count=1 -> (count’=2);
8 [f2??] count=0 -> (count’=1) & (informf’=true);
9 [f2??] count=1 -> (count’=2);
10
11 [u1??] count=2 -> (count’=1);
12 [21??] count=1 -> (count’=0) & (informu’=true);
13 [u2??] count=2 -> (count’=1);
14 [u2??] count=1 -> (count’=0) & (informu’=true);
15
16 [f!!] informf & count!=0 -> (informf’=false);
17 [u!!] informu & count=0 -> (informu’=false);
18 endmodule
In the OR gate model, a counter (count) is used to register how many inputs
have failed at each moment. The failing of an input increases the counter, while
the repair of an input decreases the counter. We of course take as a premise that
an input will not break two times in a row without being repaired in the middle,
neither will it be repaired if it has not failed. When the counter changes its value
from 0 to 1, the gate has to inform a failure. It does so in transition at line 16,
which gets enabled by the change of variable informf either at line 6 or 8. In the
same way, when count becomes 0, the repair is informed by enabling transition
at line 17 through the change of variable informu either at line 12 or 14.
C Repair BOXes
For a repair box with first come first serve policy element e ∈ E with n inputs, its
semantics is a function [[e]] : A3∗n → IOSA, where [[(rbox, n)]](fl0, up0, r0, ..., fln−1, upn−1,
rn−1) results in the following IOSA:
1 module RBOX % with first come first serve policy
2 queue[n]: [0..n] init 0;
3 busy: bool init false;
4 r: [0..n] init n;
5 dummy: [0..0] init 0;
6
7 [fl0?] -> (dummy’=broken(queue,0));
8 ...
9 [fln−1?] -> (dummy’=broken(queue,n-1));
10
11 [!!] fstexclude(queue,0) != -1 & r = n -> (r’=maxfrom(queue,0));
12
13 [r0!!] !busy & r = 0 -> (busy’=true) & (queue[0]’=0);
14 ...
15 [rn−1!!] !busy & r = n-1 -> (busy’=true) & (queue[n-1]’=0);
16
17 [up0?] -> (queue[0]’=0) & (busy’=false) & (r’ = n);
18 ...
19 [upn−1?] -> (queue[n-1]’=0) & (busy’=false) & (r’ = n);
20 endmodule
The model for a repair box with first come first serve policy uses an array to mark
down each broken input. Notice that each position in the queue corresponds to
each input. A value 0 on an index i means that the input i has not failed, while a
greater value on that position indicates for “how long” has it been broken. Repair
boxes use some syntactic elements present in FIG (http://dsg.famaf.unc.edu.ar/fig)
simulator. These elements do not introduce a new semantics behavior and are
there only to reduce the complexity and obfuscation that would represent mod-
elling this using only the grammar presented at App. A. Examples of this are
the function broken which given an array, in this case queue, and an index, in
this case 0, it increases by one the value at that index and every other value
greater than 0 in the array. In this way we can check the order in which the
inputs failed by comparing the values at the corresponding index. The greater
the value the sooner they broke. The syntactic function fstexclude on the other
hand, takes an array and a value and returns the index of the first element with
a different value to the one passed. In this case we use it to check if there is any
failed input. If there is at least one, then maxfrom function will return the index
of the highest value in queue, which corresponds to the input who broke first in
between all the broken ones. For a quick determinism analysis we point out that
all broken, fstexclude, and maxfrom are deterministic. Furthermore all pairs of
urgent transitions in the model are confluent given that their preconditions are
mutually exclusive given the value of variable r.
For a repair box with random policy element e ∈ E with n inputs, its semantics
is a function [[e]] : A3∗n → IOSA, where [[(rbox, n)]](fl0, up0, r0, ..., fln−1, upn−1,
rn−1) results in the following IOSA:
1 module RBOX % with random policy
2 broken[n]: bool init false;
3 busy: bool init false;
4 r: [0..n] init n;
5
6 [fl0?] -> (broken[0]’=true);
7 ...
8 [fln−1?] -> (broken[n-1]’=true);
9
10 [!!] some(broken) & r = n -> (r’=random(broken));
11
12 [r0!!] !busy & r = 0 -> (busy’=true);
13 ...
14 [rn−1!!] !busy & r = n-1 -> (busy’=true);
15
16 [up0?] -> (broken[0]’=false) & (busy’=false) & (r’ = n);
17 ...
18 [upn−1?] -> (broken[n-1]’=false) & (busy’=false) & (r’ = n);
19 endmodule
The model for a random policy repair box presents two new syntactic elements
from FIG. These are the function some, which returns a boolean value indicating
if there is some value different to zero in the array, and the function random, which
models an uniform selection of an index between the non zero valued positions
at an array. Given that these two functions are deterministic, and with a similar
analysis as for the first come first serve policy repair box, we can deduce that
this is also a deterministic model.
D Voting gate
The following IOSA model corresponds to the modelling of a 2 from 3 voting
gate. A generalisation to other values of N and K can be easily obtained.
1 module VOTING
2 count: [0..3] init 0;
3 inform: bool init false;
4
5 [f0??] -> (count’=count+1) & (inform’=(count+1=2));
6 [f1??] -> (count’=count+1) & (inform’=(count+1=2));
7 [f2??] -> (count’=count+1) & (inform’=(count+1=2));
8
9 [u0??] -> (count’=count-1) & (inform’=(count=2));
10 [u1??] -> (count’=count-1) & (inform’=(count=2));
11 [u2??] -> (count’=count-1) & (inform’=(count=2));
12
13 [f!!] inform & count >= 2 -> (inform’=false);
14 [u!!] inform & count < 2 -> (inform’=false);
15 endmodule
Voting gates are modeled using a counter which counts how many inputs have
failed. This is done by listening to the corresponding fail signals at lines 5 to
7, and repair signals at lines 9 to 11. In these same lines we take into account
if we have just reached the K value (2 in our example) or if we have just gone
down this value, which are the circumstances under which to inform the failure
and repair respectively, which is finally done at lines 13 and 14. Although an
alternative modelling of these gates can be obtained by a combination of OR
and AND gates, one may want to reduce the complexity of the system modelling
by using this model, which also happens to be deterministic.
E
Proof (of Proposition 2.). Parallel composition does not introduce new non-
confluent pair of actions and, moreover, it preserves the confluency of its com-
ponents [17]. Thus, we look at the components in isolation. First notice that
transitions in an IOSA module are defined symbolically. Each symbolic tran-
sition in a module describes, in fact, a set of IOSA transitions, which become
concrete when the symbolic transition is evaluated on a state that satisfies the
guard. Notice also that a state in a module is defined by the current values of
its variables. When analyzing that two urgent actions a and b are confluent in a
module, for each symbolic transition ta and tb defined for those actions in that
module, we look for a non-confluence witness, i.e, a state that satisfies the guards
of ta and tb and shows that a and b are not confluent (i.e., the pair does not
satisfy Def. 5). Note that by only checking reachable states in the component,
we are already overapproximating the reachable states in the composition.
For this proof we only analyze the case of the AND gate. For other RFT
elements, the proof follows similarly. Let v be a vertex in a RFT such that l(v) =
(and, 2). We analyze f1 against u1 in [[(and, 2)]] (Fig. 5) and show that they are
not confluent. Take state s defined by count=1, informf=false and informu=false,
which can be easily checked to be reachable. There, we find that it enables
symbolic transitions at lines 6 (with label f1) and 14 (with label u1). On the one
hand, transition at line 6 moves to the state where count=2, informf=true and
informu=false is reached. At this point action u1 can only be performed through
transition at line 13, which yields state s′ defined by count=1, informf=true and
informu=true. On the other hand, transition at line 14 moves to the state where
count=0, informf=false and informu=false. This state only enables f1 at line
7, which yields state s′′ defined by count=1, informf=false and informu=false.
Since s′ and s′′ are two different states, we have proved that f1 and u1 are not
confluent. Similarly, we can show that the pairs (f, ui) and (u, fi), for i = 1, 2,
are not confluent.
All other pairs are confluent. Take for instance transitions at lines 7 and
10 which are defined for actions f1 and f2 respectively, and the state s defined
by count=0, informf=false and informu=false. On the one hand, line 7 leads
to the state where count=1, informf=false and informu=false which in turns
enables f2 only at line 9 yielding state s′ defined by count=2, informf=true and
informu=false. On the other hand, line 10 at state s moves to the state where
count=1, informf=false and informu=false which only enables f1 at line line 6
yielding the same state s′. The proof follows similarly from any other reachable
state enabling f1 and f2 showing, thus, that f1 and f2 are confluent. In some other
cases the proof of confluence follows from the fact that the pair of actions are
never enabled simultaneously, as it is the case, e.g., of f and u (notice that the
guards enabling each one of them are mutually exclusive). uunionsq
F The Spare Gate model
The Spare basic element (SBE). For a SBE element e ∈ E , its semantics is a
function [[e]] : A7+5∗n → IOSA, where [[(sbe, n, µ, ν, γ)]](fl, up, f, u, r, e, d, rq0, asg0,
rel0, acc0, rj0, ..., rqn−1, asgn−1, reln−1, accn−1, rjn−1) results in the following pair
of IOSA modules:
1 module SBE
2 fc, dfc, rc : clock;
3 inform : [0..2] init 0;
4 active : bool init false;
5 broken : [0..2] init 0;
6
7 [e??] !active -> (active’=true) & (fc’=µ);
8 [d??] active -> (active’=false) & (dfc’=ν);
9
10 [fl!] active & broken=0 @ fc -> (inform’=1) & (broken’=1);
11 [fl!] !active & broken=0 @ dfc -> (inform’=1) & (broken’=1);
12 [r??] -> (broken’=2) & (rc’=γ);
13 [up!] active & broken=2 @ rc -> (inform’=2) & (broken’=0) & (fc’=µ);
14 [up!] !active & broken=2 @ rc -> (inform’=2) & (broken’=0) & (dfc’=µ);
15
16 [f!!] inform=1 -> (inform’=0);
17 [u!!] inform=2 -> (inform’=0);
18 endmodule
1 module MUX
2 queue[n]: [0..3] init 0; % idle, requesting, reject, using
3 avail: bool init true;
4 broken: bool init false;
5 enable: [0..2] init 0;
6
7 [fl?] -> (broken’=true);
8 [up?] -> (broken’=false);
9
10 [e!!] enable=1 -> (enable’=0);
11 [d!!] enable=2 -> (enable’=0);
12
13 [rq0??] queue[0]=0 & (broken | !avail) -> (queue[0]’=2);
14 [rq0??] queue[0]=0 & !broken & avail -> (queue[0]’=1);
15 [asg0!!] queue[0]=1 & !broken & avail -> (queue[0]’=3) & (avail’=false);
16 [rj0!!] queue[0]=2 -> (queue[0]’=1);
17 [rel0??] queue[0]=3 -> (queue[0]’=0) & (avail’=true) & (enable’=2);
18 [acc0??] -> (enable’=1);
19 ...
20 [rqn−1??] queue[n-1]=0 & (broken | !avail) -> (queue[n-1]’=2);
21 [rqn−1??] queue[n-1]=0 & !broken & avail -> (queue[n-1]’=1);
22 [asgn−1!!] queue[n-1]=1 & queue[n-2]=0 & ... & queue[0]=0 & !broken & avail
23 -> (queue[n-1]’=3) & (avail’=false);
24 [rjn−1!!] queue[n-1]=2 -> (queue[n-1]’=1);
25 [reln−1??] queue[n-1]=3 -> (queue[n-1]’=0) & (avail’=true) & (enable’=2);
26 [accn−1??] -> (enable’=1);
27
28 endmodule
The model for a Spare basic element consists in two IOSA modules. One of them
presents the behaviour of a basic element which can be enabled and disabled,
and an other module, the multiplexer, which presents the means to manage the
sharing of the SBE between the interested Spare Gates. In this case, we have
decided to model the multiplexer with a priority policy, which prioritizes lower
index input spare gates to higher indexed ones (notice assignment transitions at
line 15 and 22 of the multiplexer module.) Other kinds of policies can be defined
as for repair box gates. In the model, actions rqi indicate that the spare gate
input i is requesting the spare. acci indicates that input i accepts the spare that
has previously been assigned to it through action asgi. On the other hand action
rji indicates that it rejects it. Action reli indicates that input i is releasing the
spare that has previously been assigned to it. Finally actions e and d enable and
disable the spare basic element when needed.
The Spare Gate (SG). For a spare gate element e ∈ E with priority policy, its se-
mantics is a function [[e]] : A4+7∗n → IOSA, where [[(sg, n)]](f, u, fl0, up0, fl1, up1,
rq1, asg1, acc1,rj1, rel1..., fln, upn, rqn, asgn, accn, rjn, reln) results in the following
IOSA:
1 module SPAREGATE
2 state: [0..4] init 0; // on main, request, wait, on spare, broken
3 inform: [0..2] init 0;
4 release: [-n..n] init 0;
5 idx: [1..n] init 1;
6
7 [fl0?] state=0 -> (state’=1) & (idx’=1);
8 [up0?] state=4 -> (state’=0) & (inform’=2);
9 [up0?] state=3 & idx=1 -> (state’=0) & (idx’=1) & (release’=1);
10 ...
11 [up0?] state=3 & idx=n -> (state’=0) & (idx’=1) & (release’=n);
12
13 [fl1?] state=3 & idx=1 -> (release’=1);
14 ...
15 [fln?] state=3 & idx=n -> (release’=n);
16
17 [rq1!!] state=1 & idx=1 -> (state’=2);
18 ...
19 [rqn!!] state=1 & idx=n -> (state’=2);
20
21 [asg1??] state=0 | state=1 | state=3 -> (release’=1);
22 [asg1??] state=2 & idx=1 -> (release’=-1) & (state’=3);
23 [asg1??] state=4 -> (release’=-1) & (state’=3) & (idx’=1) & (inform’=2);
24 ...
25 [asgn??] state=0 | state=1 | state=3 -> (release’=n);
26 [asgn??] state=2 & idx=n -> (release’=-n) & (state’=3);
27 [asgn??] state=4 -> (release’=-n) & (state’=3) & (idx’=n) & (inform’=2);
28
29 [rj1??] state=2 & idx=1 -> (idx’=2) & (state’=1);
30 [rj2??] state=2 & idx=2 -> (idx’=3) & (state’=1);
31 ...
32 [rjn??] state=2 & idx=n -> (state’=4) & (idx’=1) & (inform’=1);
33
34 [rel1!!] release=1 & !(state=3 & idx=1) -> (release’= 0);
35 [rel1!!] release=1 & state=3 & idx=1 -> (release’= 0) & (state’=1) & (idx’=1);
36 ...
37
38 [reln!!] release=n & !(state=3 & idx=n) -> (release’=0);
39 [reln!!] release=n & state=3 & idx=n -> (release’= 0) & (state’=1) & (idx’=1);
40
41 [acc1!!] release=-1 -> (release’= 0);
42 ...
43 [accn!!] release=-n -> (release’=0);
44
45 [f!!] inform = 1 -> (inform’=0);
46 [u!!] inform = 2 -> (inform’=0);
47 endmodule
The Spare Gate model is using a priority policy over the available Spare BEs.
This means that when looking for a Spare BE, it will start asking for it to the
lower index inputs and go on with higher index until obtaining a replacement.
Other policies can be defined into the spare gate too, just as with the multiplexer
and the repair box. In the SG model, a variable state distinguishes from when
the SG is working with its main BE, requesting a SBE, waiting for a response
from its inputs, working on a SBE or broken. A vector named release indicates
for each SBE input i when the SG has to release (value i) or accept (value −i)
the assignment of that SBE. A variable idx indicates which of the inputs to
request next. At line 7 the SG defines the transition which starts with the SBE
acquiring protocol whenever the main BE fails. The following transitions up to
line 15 are there to release the acquired SBEs whenever they fail or the main BE
is repaired. Transitions from lines 17 to 19 are there to request for each available
SBE. After doing so, we need to wait for a response from the corresponding
multiplexer (state’=2). The request can be rejected (lines 29 to 32), and we
proceed by asking for the next SBE by setting idx to the corresponding value
if there is one, or by failing in case none of the SBE where available (state’=4
at line 32). A SBE can be assigned to us when not needed anymore (lines 21
and 25), or when we where expecting it in order to avoid failing (lines 22 and
26), or when we had already failed and thus we get repaired by using it (lines
23 and 27). I may want to release a SBE when it is assigned to me and I do not
need it (lines 34 and 38) or when it fails while I am using it (lines 35 and 39).
Finally we accept assigned SBEs at lines 41 to 43 and we signal failure at line 45
and repair at line 46. To further understand the meaning and intuition of each
transition we refer the reader to the SBE description which heavily synchronizes
its transitions with the SG model.
